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1 Introduction
Unemployment has been relatively high in many European countries for more
than 30 years. However, since the 1990s some countries have managed to reduce
unemployment substantially, like the United Kingdom, while others seem to be
stuck at high unemployment levels, like Germany and France. This divergence
among European countries offers evidence about the causes and cures of un-
employment. This paper begins by presenting some evidence that the countries
who got out of the unemployment problem implemented a number of labor mar-
ket reforms. I then discuss the potential obstacles to labor market flexibility,
and offer some perspectives to explain which why some counties have reformed
their labor markets and others have not.
2 What have we learned?
2.1 Basic facts
Unemployment had been historically very low in most European countries dur-
ing the 1960s. However, it rose sharply in the early 1970s across most of Europe.
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Since the since the mid-1980s, Europe has seen a diverging unemployment pat-
tern. The only big country that seems to have escaped from persistent long-term
unemployment is the United Kingdom, but unemployment has also fallen in Ire-
land, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Portugal. The three largest continental
economies, France, Italy, and Germany, have all seen continued high unemploy-
ment. In Spain, unemployment has fallen sharply in recent years, but that was
from a pathologically high level, and it remains higher there than in most other
European countries. Scandinavian countries escaped the rise in unemployment
of the 1970s, but experienced a sharp increase in the 1990s, due to external
macroeconomic shocks. Since then, unemployment has fallen back to secular
low levels in Norway and Sweden, but not Finland.
Table 1 illustrates these patterns. In some sense, one should no longer talk
of a common European unemployment problem.
These high and low unemployment rates in different countries cannot be
explained by obvious measurement issues, like cross-country differences in the
definition of unemployment. For example, France uses a definition of unem-
ployment that does not include government relief jobs or early retirement, and
France also has the lowest work week in Europe for full-time employed workers
(OECD Labor force statistics, 2003), but the unemployment rate in France is
high nonetheless. Indeed,the cross-country correlation between hours worked
per employee and unemployment is essentially zero.1Spain has a very low labor
force participation rate, which might seem to suggest that many unemployed
are being classified as out of the labor force, but Spain has a high unemployment
rate nonetheless. Also, the correlation across countries between unemployment
and Labor force participation in 2000 was -0.5, so countries with high unem-
ployment tend to have lower participation. The popular view that a lot of
unemployment in the Netherlands is hidden as disability is not inaccurate, but
it does not explain the fall in unemployment there: the fraction of workers on
1These correlations were computed using the OECD Economic outlook database.
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disability benefits has also fallen. The divergence in unemployment rates across
Europe represents a real difference in labor markets, not a statistical artifact.
Unemployment rate
Country 1970 1980 1990 1995 2000
Austria 1.6 1.6 4.7 5.9 5.8
Belgium 1.9 7.9 8.7 12.9 10.6
Denmark 1.3 6.9 9.4 10.2 5.8
Finland 1.9 4.7 3.2 15.4 9.1
France 2.5 6.2 8.9 11.6 10.3
Germany 0.6 3.2 6.2 8.1 8.7
Greece 4.2 2.8 7.0 10.0 10.9
Ireland 5.6 7.0 12.9 12.2 5.0
Italy 4.0 5.6 9.1 11.7 11.2
Netherlands 0.9 4.0 6.0 7.1 3.2
Norway 1.4 1.7 5.2 4.9 3.8
Portugal 5.8 9.5 4.7 7.2 4.3
Spain 2.7 10.9 15.7 22.7 14.0
Sweden 1.5 2.0 1.7 7.7 4.5
United Kingdom 2.4 6.1 5.9 8.6 6.0
EU Average 2.1 5.0 7.4 10.5 8.4
Table 1 — The evolution of unemployment rates in the European Union
2.2 Potential explanations
When European unemployment started to increase in the 1970s, the cause was
typically ascribed to the first oil price shock in 1973-74 (Bruno and Sachs, 1985).
Then came the second oil price shock in 1979-80, followed by contractionary
monetary policies in the 1980s. Thus, through the 1970s and into the 1980s
there was always an ”immediate cause” for higher unemployment that could be
formulated in terms of short-run fluctuations.
But in the later 1980s and 1990s, as European unemployment failed to re-
turn to its initial level, a rough consensus emerged that high unemployment in
Europe was due to labor market rigidities. Some of these increase the equilib-
rium rate of unemployment by boosting the incumbent employee’s bargaining
power in wage setting, like high minimum wages, strict work rules or extensive
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employment protection (which includes limitations on firings and dismissals as
well as restrictions on the employer’s freedom to assign tasks and workplaces to
workers). These also include provisions for mandatory collective bargaining and
extension of collective agreements negotiated by unions and employer’s organi-
zations to a whole sector, regardless of how representative these organizations
are. Other rigidities improves the fallback options of employees, by methods like
increasing the level and duration of unemployment benefits and other welfare
payments, or by loosening the standards for receiving such benefits. Taxes that
increase the wedge between workers’ marginal productivity and their take home
pay also tend to reduce employment (their effect on unemployment is smaller
because they also reduce participation, although in my view still negative). Fi-
nally, the degree of centralization and coordination of wage-setting (e.g. whether
wages are negotiated at the national, industry, regional or firm level) is also an
important factor. Coordination between unions setting wages for, say, different
industries has two conflicting effects. It enhances their monopoly power but also
induces them to internalize the negative effects of higher wages in one sector
on the purchasing power of workers in other sectors. As a result, the dominant
view is that very high or very low centralization of wage setting generate less
wage pressure than intermediate levels of centralization (Calmfors and Driffill,
1988). Multiple bargaining levels that set floors but not caps on wage increases
are also observed and obviously tend to increase wage pressure (see for example
Blanchard et al., 1995).
While rigidities tend to push wages up, ultimately wages must be compatible
with productivity. Because, everything else equal, a higher rate of unemploy-
ment reduces workers’ fallback options, it tends to reduce wages. Thus the
equilibrium rate of unemployment adjusts to make wage demands compatible
with productivity (Layard, Nickell and Jackman, 1990). If institutions become
more rigid, wages will tend to go up. But as that is not justified by productivity,
employment will fall until the resulting increase in unemployment exerts enough
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downward pressure on wages to offset the impact effect of greater rigidity. That
is the mechanism by which rigidities increase the natural rate of unemployment.
This hypothesis must pass two tests. First, have labor market rigidities
across Europe increased or become more relevant during the high unemployment
period as compared to the 1960s? After all, European labor markets already
exhibited rigidities in the 1960s. Second, do divergences across countries in these
rigidities help to understand the subsequent divergence in unemployment? My
answer to both questions is a qualified yes.
Nickell (2003) provides a concise and synthetic assessment of the evolution
of labor market institutions in Europe and their impact on unemployment. It
shows that in most countries, labor markets are more rigid now, along a number
of dimensions, than in the 1960s. Virtually all European countries except the
United Kingdom saw a sharp increase in unemployment benefits in between
1960 and 1999. Indices of employment protection legislation have gone up in
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Portugal, Sweden, and the UK.
They have fallen (but only slightly) in Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway,
and Spain. Finally, taxes on labor have gone up everywhere.2
Moreover, countries that managed to reduce unemployment in the 1990s did
so by implementing some wage moderation mechanisms, often through a com-
prehensive reform package. For example, Netherlands experienced an increase
in the strictness of unemployment benefit administration, better coordination
in wage-setting (the Wassenaar agreement), lower labor taxes and less strict
employment protection. The United Kingdom has a less clear pattern, since the
duration of unemployment benefits rose, but had many changes that went in
2Thus it is excessive, as some authors do, to claim that institutions are not responsible for
the rise in European Unemployment, because European labor markets were already rigid in the
sixties. For that reason, it is unlikely that unemployment is only due to shocks and different
persistent responses to these shocks (See Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000 for an analysis); at a
minimum these shocks should affect the political dynamics of institutions so as to permanently
change them. It also contradicts the view that the rise in European unemployment is entirely
explained by a shift from a ”good” equilibrium to a ”bad” one under constant institutions (as
in Blanchard and Summers (1988), Saint-Paul (1995)). Such a shift is possible, but then the
”good” equilibrium itself is likely to have deteriorated.
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the direction of lower unemployment: unemployment benefits replaced a lower
share of income, stricter benefit administration, much reduced union coverage,
lower union density, lower labor taxes. Ireland experienced similar institutional
changes as the UK. It is the country where unemployment has fallen most rapidly
in the second half of the nineties, and during that period, all institutional indi-
cators went in the direction of lower unemployment, except UB duration, whose
lengthening was probably innocuous (as in the UK) in light of the sharp fall
in average replacement rations, and employment protection, which remained
untouched.3
Conversely, countries that did not implement significant and widespread
reforms have experienced continuing high unemployment. For example, between
1980 and 2000, benefit duration lengthened in France, union coverage went up,
coordination of wage setting went down, and employment protection became
stricter. In Italy, another high unemployment country, the size of unemployment
benefits relative to income went up, and so did labor taxes. In Germany, the
duration of unemployment benefits lengthened.
Nickell (2003) summarizes these diverging experiences by correlating the
change in unemployment across countries in the nineties with labor market re-
forms, and finds the expected sign. Therefore, evidence supports the traditional
view that rigidities that reduce competition in labor markets are typically re-
sponsible for high unemployment. Reducing these rigidities across the board
seems to work. But the empirical evidence is much less clear how much would
be gained, if anything, by increasing labor market flexibility along one or two
dimensions only. If one takes unemployment benefits, for example, there is a
general tendency for the replacement ratio, which is the share of income replaced
3One intriguing fact is that most of the gains in the low unemployment club were realized
during the expansionary phase of the second half of the 1990s. From a layman’s perspective,
this makes sense: structural reform is useless if the jobs are not there. But economists
know that the connection between economic growth and job creation isn’t obvious. We know
that plenty of jobs are created during recessions (Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh, 1996).
Moreover, we typically think that the relationship between labor market tightness and wage (or
inflationary) pressure is convex, so that the increase in labor demand triggered by structural
reforms should create more jobs in recessions than in expansions.
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by such benefits, to fall during the 1990s. But using the Database for Interna-
tional Comparisons in Europe (DICE) of the University of Munich’s Institute
for Economic Research, one finds that the correlation between lower unemploy-
ment benefits and lower unemployment is positive, as expected (+0.37), but
insignificant. However, researchers have found a positive and statistically sig-
nificant association between shorter duration of unemployment benefits and the
unemployment rate (for example, Bean, 1994).
2.3 Additional Evidence: The Evolution of Rents
Instead of attempting to measure the impact of changes in labor market in-
stitutions, a different approach is to look at direct quantitative measures of
the labor market’s competitiveness. Along these lines, Saint-Paul (2004) tries
to measure labor market competitiveness by constructing indices of the welfare
difference between an employed workers and a similar unemployed worker - that
is, what is the rent to being employed? To measure rents, Saint-Paul (2004)
uses two different approaches. The first one exploits variation across industries
of wages, which are one measure of worker rents (Krueger and Summers, 1988).
A related approach is to look at wage differentials across firm size. The second
approach, as in Cohen (1999), tries to estimate a dynamic process for individual
transitions between employment and unemployment, and to use the estimated
coefficients to compute the present discounted value of being employed and the
present discounted value of being unemployed for any given category of worker.
The results suggest that, with the possible exception of Ireland, there is no
robust evidence that worker rents have fallen in the nineties. While these may be
due to data problems, the results lend themselves to several interpretation. One
is that, in the countries that reformed their labor market, competition between
outsiders and insiders has not increased; unemployment has been reduced simply
by lowering the welfare of the unemployed. Another interpretation, however,
is that while labor deregulation reduces worker’s rents along some dimensions,
7
it increases it along others; in particular, wages may be more tightly linked
to individual productivity, which may increase wage dispersion and measured
employee rents.
If one takes these negative results as indicating that the reforms that reduced
unemployment in a number of countries, did not increase competition between
insiders and outsiders, that is disappointing from a perspective of allocative
efficiency. Nevertheless, these countries’ labor markets improved relative to
those who did not implement reforms.
3 Obstacles to reform
A number of European countries have failed to implement substantial labor
market reforms, despite evidence from nearby countries that such reforms could
help to reduce their high unemployment rates. Why have they failed to act?
This section discussed considerations of political economy, ideology and agency
that can affect whether a country will undertake certain labor market reforms.
3.1 Political economy
Across Europe, powerful constituencies of incumbent employees may seek to
block labor market reforms. Political support for labor market rigidities will
arise when a sufficiently large fraction of the workforce earn rents, when these
rents can be enhanced by manipulating market outcomes through institutions,
and when alternative, less distortionary means of redistributions are not feasible.
Alternatively, one may view manipulating labor market institutions by means
of voting and lobbying activities as a way for incumbent employees to achieve
monopoly power at the economy-wide level. They achieve that monopoly power
at the expense of other social groups.
While many people tend to think of labour issues as a conflict between labor
and capital, labor market rigidities are more usefully thought of as pitting some
workers against others. After all, international capital mobility implies that
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capital adjusts very elastically to changes in its rate of return, so redistribution
away from capitalists can only occur in the short run. In the medium run, labor
market rigidities redistribute between different categories of workers. For ex-
ample, wage rigidity may benefit employed ”unskilled”, or ”moderately skilled”
workers, at the expense of skilled ones. Similarly, rigidities may redistribute
in favor of workers in one sector at the expense of workers in other sectors, by
raising the relative price of that sector and then the wages of its workers.
The political economy approach to explaining the persistence and growth of
labor market rigidities makes a number of predictions, as spelled out in Saint-
Paul (1996, 2000, 2002).
First, labor market institutions will be determined more by the interests of
employed workers than unemployed ones. Consequently, labor market institu-
tions will not be designed to achieve full employment, and they will imply more
wage rigidity and more employment protection than socially optimal4.
Second, the gains and losses to the insiders from labor market institutions
depend on the economic environment. For example, when the elasticity of labor
demand is high, regulation does a poorer job at increasing the wages of incum-
bent employees - because a given wage rise will reduce employment by a larger
amount. If insiders are exposed to possible unemployment, then the more they
will take the concerns of the unemployed into account and the greater the value
that will be placed on reforms that boost job creation. Conversely, if insiders are
extremely sheltered from job loss, they will not gain from such reforms. Greater
underlying inequality of skills also affects the political support for labor market
institutions; for example, a compressed wage structure will destroy more jobs if
the underlying distribution of skills is more unequal, and that may reduce the
support for such an institution.
4They may imply either more or less generous unemployment benefits than socially optimal,
depending on whether the insurance effects of unemployment benefits dominate their effects
on wage formation (Saint-Paul, 2000, ch. 5). Note also that the socially optimal degree of
employment protection need not be zero if there exists microeconomic frictions in the labor
market and if there is a limited set of policy instruments to cope with them (Saint-Paul, 2000,
ch. 4).
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Third, some labor market rigidities create their own constituency, which
leads to a bias in favor of the status quo. For example, if employment protec-
tion maintains a number of workers in unproductive jobs that would not exist
absent employment protection, these workers will favor maintaining employment
protection.
Fourth, complementarities across rigidities arise: The existence of one in-
stitution often creates political support for another institution5. For example,
employment protection reduces workers’ exposure to unemployment, which they
value if they earn rents. Assume there exists an institution that increases the
wages of some categories of workers, and therefore creates rents for these work-
ers. Then the political support for employment protection is greater if that
institution is present than if it is not. Conversely, if employment protection
exists, workers are less exposed to job loss. This makes them more likely to
support any institution which raises labor costs, for they are less likely to lose
their jobs as a result. This insight helps to explain why packages of labor market
reforms seem to have been more efficient than isolated reforms.
Many European reforms of employment protection legislation have offered
exceptions for temporary workers, thus liberalizing the labor market at the mar-
gin by creating a ”two-tier” labor market. 6 For example, temporary contracts
have been used in this way in Spain, France, Italy, Portugal, and Germany.
These examples are illustrative of how political constraints may shape reforms.
By leaving the insider’s employment protection unchanged, the government can
buy their political support for other reforms. Furthermore, these reforms typi-
cally take place at times when insiders are exposed to unemployment - that is, at
times when they have more to gain from boosting job creation (see Saint-Paul,
1996).
5See Saint-Paul (2000, ch. 9) for a discussion. Complementarities may also arise from
other economic mechanisms, see Orszag and Snower (1998).
6These are analyzed in Saint-Paul (1993, 2000 ch. 8), from a political economy viewpoint.
Economic analysis of these reforms include Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992), Jimeno and To-
haria (1993), Bentolila and Dolado (1994), and, more recently, Guell-Rottlan (2000), and
Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002).
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Two-tier reforms may also start political dynamics that are conducive to
further reforms. If those who hold flexible, or temporary contracts, become nu-
merous enough, they can become used as a political constituency to implement
further reforms. In Spain, for example, temporary contracts soon accounted
for one-third of employment, and so reforms reducing employment protection
for workers with permanent contracts were implemented in the 1990s in ex-
change for further restrictions in the use of temporary contracts. By contrast,
in France, Italy, and Germany, where temporary contracts account for only 10-
15 percent of total employment, virtually no reform of employment protection
for permanent workers took place.
The political dynamics of temporary contracts raises an interesting question:
can political constraints lead to labor market reforms that are worse for job
creation than no reforms? For example, a number of authors have argued that
a two-tier system of employment protection may be detrimental to employment
and/or welfare — for example, if workers with temporary contracts bear most or
all of the burden of labor turnover and wage adjustment (Bentolila and Dolado,
1994; Cahuc and Postel-Vinay, 2003). While one may dispute the benefits and
costs of a two-tier employment system, let us focus here on the broader question
of whether reducing the power of insiders can be bad for job creation.
As a starting point, recognize that the main force opposing insiders in the
political design of labor market institutions is not the unemployed, who are un-
organized and command little political influence, but rather employers. Thus,
the question can more fundamentally be reformulated as: can a reform be good
for employers, bad for labor market insiders, and detrimental for net job cre-
ation? Examples of such policies readily come to mind. We know from the
theoretical literature that a reduction of firing costs may reduce employment
(Bentolila and Bertola, 1990; Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 1994), yet it unambigu-
ously increases profits. Increases in total labor supply through immigration
or subsidies to young or female workers’ participation in the labor market are
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unlikely to reduce equilibrium unemployment, but would benefit firms.
However, there is often a convergence of interests between employers and the
unemployed. The reason is that higher profits for the former increases hirings,
and thus the probability of exiting unemployment. One can actually show that
in equilibrium, if there is free entry of firms, a change in labor regulation which
increases profits upon impact, raises the equilibrium welfare of the unemployed
(see Saint-Paul 2000, ch. 2, for a formal result along these lines). That in-
built convergence of interests between the unemployed and firms implies that
reforms pushed by employers eventually benefit the unemployed, so that the
relative lack of power of the unemployed is compensated by employers’ influence.
However, recall that this is true only under free entry, i.e. if firms fully compete
to attract workers. If product market regulation hinders entry, firms may in
principle advocate reforms that harm both the employed and the unemployed.
An interesting implication is that greater product market deregulation may
make it more likely that labor market deregulation has positive effects on the
unemployed’s welfare.
3.2 Ideology and beliefs
Ideologies and representations about the functioning of the economy play an
important role in shaping beliefs about what should be done. The combination
of a given policymakers’ preferred ”school” and some emotional discourse about
”helping people” may lead to misguided policies which will not cure unemploy-
ment, although they will often benefit some interest groups, who will gain from
promoting the underlying ”school” or ideology.
Some examples of ideologies may help illustrate this point. Of course, in
the real world these ideologies are often mixed together or stated in implicit or
concealed ways. First, consider the view that all unemployment is Keynesian
and that the long-run equilibrium rate of unemployment is zero or very low.
Advocates of this view will respond to unemployment by arguing that expan-
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sionary fiscal and monetary tools have not yet gone far enough.7 Second, union
leaders often argue that an increase in wages will help reduce unemployment and
end a recession, because the higher wages will stimulate consumption. 8 Such
an effect will occur only if workers spend than capitalists, and even then, any
positive effect on employment is bound to be short-lived, while the long-term
effects are likely to be negative.
Third, the ”lump-of-labor” fallacy, which holds that the total amount of
work is fixed and can only be shared among those who want to work. This view
has led to many misguided policies, such as pre-retirement to ”make room” for
the young, or working time reduction. These policies have been quite prominent
in France, but also have had some impact in the Netherlands, Germany, and
Belgium. They are likely to have harmed employment, as recently shown by
Crépon and Kramarz (2002).
Another ideology is the general skepticism about the allocative role of prices
in general, and of wages in particular. Dismissing the common sense view that
less labor is demanded when its price goes up amounts to dismissing all policies
that would lead to reductions in wages, or in the total cost of labor, in order
to create jobs. To be sure, it can be difficult in econometric studies to show
conclusively that substantially less labor is demanded when its price goes up.
However, this must eventually be true for high enough wages, and recent studies
(Dolado et al (1996), Laroque and Salanié, 2002) have made a rather convincing
empirical case that increases in labor costs reduce employment , at least when
starting from levels as high as those which prevail in European countries.
Finally, people also tend to be more confident about the direct effects of
7 Ironically, this view can in, fact be accommodated within mainstream economics: the
”hysteresis” literature provides mechanisms by which a temporary demand shock may per-
manently affect the natural rate of unemployment (Blanchard and Summers, 1986; Gottfries
and Horn, 1987)). Yet as argued by Layard et al. (1990), it is unlikely that persistence mech-
anisms are strong enough to explain high European unemployment for 30 years. Incidentally,
defenders of the ”100 % Keynesian” view rarely if ever refer to hysteresis.
8A typical example can be found in a text from the French Union CGT
(Confederation Generale du Travail), ”Sortir du bourbier des bas salaires”,
http://www.construction.cgt.fr/communication/tracts/tractsalaires.doc
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policies than about their indirect ones (Gersbach and Schniewind, 2001). Thus,
the direct effect of a reduction in the minimum wage is to reduce the income of
minimum wage earners; subsequent job creation only comes later. The direct
effect of reducing employment protection is that some workers will lose their
jobs; the benefits in terms of job creation come late. Reductions in the generos-
ity of unemployment benefits impose ”hardship” on the unemployed, but their
beneficial effects on employment involve the complex process of wage bargaining.
To understand how ideologies like these may interact with political economy,
consider an economy with three categories of labor: skilled workers, for whom
the labor market is perfectly competitive; medium skilled workers, and low-
skill workers. Assume the medium-skilled workers are perfect substitutes for the
low-skilled, but more productive. On the other hand, the high skilled workers
are complementary with these two factors of production. Let us introduce a
binding minimum wage w¯, so that the least skilled are not fully employed. In
equilibrium, their wage is precisely equal to the minimum wage. The wage of the
medium-skilled’s wage will be larger than the low-skilled, by a constant factor
equal to the ratio between their productivity and that of the unskilled. Finally,
the minimum wage reduces the wage of the high skilled, since firms use less of
the complementary inputs in production.
In this setting, an increase in the minimum wage benefits the medium-skilled,
since their greater productivity guarantees that they remain at full employment
(at least as long as some low-skilled remain employed), and their wage is a
multiple of the minimum wage, because of substitutability between them and
the low-skilled. That is, a greater minimum wage increases the medium-skilled’s
income because it reduces competition between them and the low-skilled. On
the other hand, an increase in the minimum wage unambiguously harms the
highly skilled, as the reduction in employment of the low-skilled, with whom
they are complementary, lowers their productivity.
What about the welfare of the low skilled? An increase in the minimum
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wage raises the wage of those who are employed, but increases the number of
those who are unemployed. Assume that, at the time society decides on the
level of the minimum wage, low-skilled workers do not know in advance whether
they will continue to be employed after the minimum wage is enacted, and in
fact are quite uncertain even about the probability that they will lose their
jobs. Consequently, to the extent that the low-skilled’s opinion matters to the
policies that are followed, it is in the interest of the medium skilled to promote
the ideology that the elasticity of the demand for unskilled workers is quite low,
while the high skilled have an incentive to promote the opposite views. 9 These
incentives hold regardless of the true value of the elasticity and of whether these
groups know it or not.
The next question is by what means can a group manipulate the views of
the another group; for example, how can the medium-skilled convince the low-
skilled that minimum wage hikes destroy only a few jobs? The research on how
beliefs are formed and why some beliefs are more popular is not very conclusive.
But neuroscientists, for example, have shown that statements that are often
repeated tend to be believed regardless of the rational basis for considering them
as true10. One may then expect that the high-skilled and the medium-skilled
would compete with each other in sending repeated messages to the low-skilled,
using the media and the education system. Moreover, if the actual effect of the
policy is not as advertised, then there will be an incentive to create unnecessary
complexity in labor market institutions, because it will prevent or slow learning
about how the economy’s actually operates.
There is some evidence that beliefs about labor market institutions are un-
likely to be grounded on knowledge of facts. Postel-Vinay and Saint-Martin
9One can think of a number of other plausible examples. For example, in order to buy
the support of skilled workers, unions may convey the view that their policies redistribute
between labor and capital, whereas in a world of international capital mobility they in fact
redistribute between skilled and unskilled workers. That example was suggested to me by
Olivier Blanchard.
10 See Camerer et al (2003), Gilbert and Gill (2000).
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(2003), using socioeconomic surveys, construct indicators of workers’ subjective
assessment of their job security for a number of European countries. They find
that countries where workers feel more insecure are countries where employment
protection is stricter. However, these authors do not investigate how these be-
liefs are created and sustained. Another piece of evidence is given by Blanchard
and Philippon (2003), who argue that the degree of trust between labor and
capital, if measured by strike activity, statistically explains part of the diver-
gence between high and low unemployment countries. When trust is not present,
unions do not believe firm’s statements about labor costs and profitability, and
stick to their view of the world. Clearly, disagreements over ideology can hinder
the formation of trust.
Finally, the methodological problems that plague social sciences can be taken
advantage of by interest groups to promote their views in the media. Let us give
two telling examples in the French context of how interest groups can intervene
directly to manipulate the production and dissemination of knowledge.
In the context of the debate in France over limiting the length of the work-
week, the lump of labor fallacy was repeatedly put forward. Studies were pro-
duced showing that working time reduction created a number of jobs during a
given number of years, on the basis of short-run Keynesian models that were
grossly unsuitable for dealing with these kind of issues (see Cette (2000), Cette
and Taddei (1998)). Indeed, these studies took such a crude approach to wage
formation and aggregate supply, that they actually predicted that the long-term
effect of working time reduction on employment would be zero, simply because
the long-term equilibrium rate of unemployment was modelled as exogenous.
As a result, these studies predict a long-run effect of working time reduction
on total hours worked which is negative, so that GDP should go down as well.
Nonetheless, the studies conveyed to the public the false impression that ex-
perts agreed that working-time reduction created jobs, based on the short-run
effects of this policy that were purely Keynesian (employment increased in the
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short run because aggregate demand fell less than productivity per worker),
and therefore could have been obtained at a much lower cost with traditional
fiscal stimulus.
In the other episode, which took place in 2000, unions at the statistical ad-
ministration, INSEE, protested against the publication in its journal of an econo-
metric study by two leading economists, Guy Laroque and Bernard Salanié,
which showed that the French minimum wage destroyed jobs. The unions in-
sisted that alternative studies pointed to an opposite conclusion, and pressured
the management of that administration to state publicly that it did not endorse
that study.11 Clearly, the union’s preference for the alternative studies is un-
likely to be based on its rational scientific assessment. That episode squares
well with the argument that it need not matter too much about whether an ide-
ology is correct, as long as key interest groups know which ideology will benefit
them. In this way, public beliefs about economics may well be determined by
the political power of different groups, and there is no reason to expect ”truer”
views of the world to prevail.
3.3 Agency
Economists often tend to assume that economic policies may be implemented
without obstacle, as if the government were an integrated command structure
similar to an army. But governments are replete with agency problems ( a
number of them have been analyzed by Laffont and Tirole (1993)). For example,
some economists argue that a tight monitoring of the unemployed’s job search
activity is desirable. In turn, this belief leads to a recommendation that instead
of reducing social insurance by lowering unemployment benefits, one should just
monitor the behavior of the unemployed and stop paying benefits to those who
do not attempt to find suitable jobs or who turn down such jobs. However, the
11An english language version of their paper can be found in Laroque and Salanie (2002).
The open letter sent by the unions (in French) can be read at the unions’ web site:
http://cgtinsee.free.fr/dossiers/etudes/Larosala.htm
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employment agency workers who are supposed to implement such policies often
consider the unemployed, not the taxpayers, as their clients. After all, they are
in contact with the unemployed on a daily basis, and civil servants typically lack
any incentive mechanism to internalize the government’s objective. It is all too
easy, for example, for the employment agency worker to believe quite readily
that a job offer was ”unsuitable” after all.
One can get an idea of the magnitude of the government agency problem by
looking at the functioning of the unemployment agencies or public employment
services in the related area of placement. Public services typically do a poor
job at bringing unemployed workers and vacant positions together. The OECD
(1991) politely reports that ”it seems likely that at least in many EC countries,
many people becoming unemployed during the eighties were not contacted with
any proposal to apply for a specific job during their first year of unemploy-
ment. For many unemployed people, this may carry the message that (...) the
authorities are not really very concerned to encourage continued job search”.
As confirmed by Table 2, in many countries, the public employment service is
virtually useless for workers to find a job: the first column shows the stock of
vacancies at the employment office per unemployed worker, while the second
one the average interval between two consecutive contacts with an employer
that an unemployed gets via the employment office.
Country Vacancy per unemployed Interval between vacancies (Months)
Spain 0.01 37.4
Portugal 0.02 —
Belgium 0.03 20.6
France 0.03 21.1
Netherlands 0.05 15.8
U.K. 0.07 7.8
Germany 0.1 7.4
Finland 0.12 4.3
Austria 0.25 3
Norway 0.22 1.7
Sweden 0.58 0.9
Table 2: The efficiency of the public placement service in the 1980s. Source:
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OECD (1991)
The problem is compounded by the fact that in several countries, the public
service has (or had, until recently) a monopoly on job placement. That is, while
employers can directly advertise their vacant jobs, intermediation between the
employers and job-seekers was the monopoly of the state; private intermediaries
were prohibited. This fact seems to have some explanatory power. The Eu-
ropean countries that allowed private placement companies in 1990 — Ireland,
the Netherlands, Portugal, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom — are all in
the low-unemployment club in 2000. Among those which preclude these compa-
nies, only the Scandinavian plus Austria (all thought to have highly centralized
wage-setting) are in the low-unemployment club. However, since then, state
monopoly of job placement services has recently ended in Austria, Denmark,
Finland, Germany and Spain.
From a theoretical perspective, centralizing all matches at a public service
may yield welfare gains because of economies of scale and because that service
could internalize congestion externalities exerted by participants on each other.
These externalities have been well understood by the literature (Diamond, 1981;
Pissarides, 2000): an unemployed worker looking for a job exerts a positive
externality on firms by increasing the speed with which vacancies are filled, and
a negative externality on other unemployed workers by reducing their job finding
probability. These externalities generate a too low level of search relative to the
optimum if there are aggregate economies of scale in search activities, i.e. if
doubling the number of unemployment workers and vacancies would more than
double the hiring flow.
However, there is no evidence of economies of scale (Blanchard and Dia-
mond, 1989), and, as Moen (1995) has shown, in the absence of economies of
scale, profit-seeking competitive placement services correctly price congestion
externalities, thus yielding an efficient outcome. Public employment services
appear to have little incentive to match the unemployed to vacancies. Perhaps
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bureaucratic logic dictates that they focus on the stock of unemployed workers
using their services, rather than on the exit rate from unemployment. Or po-
litical economy considerations may also be relevant: if the public employment
service is managed by labor unions (as is the case in some countries, including
France), then the unions have an interest in managing job placement so as to
reduce competition between the employed and the unemployed (see Saint-Paul,
1998).
A well-intended reform that overlooks the problem of government agency
may not only be ineffective but actually make things worse. In 1999, the French
employers’ association managed to negotiate with a fraction of the unions a
reform of the unemployment benefit system which was generally intended to
monitor the job-seeking efforts of the unemployed more closely. However, to get
support from the (then left-wing) legislature and the other unions, the scheme
had to be amended; in particular, the commitment asked from the unemployed
worker evolved towards a pledge for job search, and the previously existing
pattern of declining unemployment benefits over time was abolished. It is not
clear at all, then, whether the positive effects (on unemployment) of more intense
job search will dominate the negative effects of the fact that benefits are no
longer decreasing with time.
4 Explaining divergence: research directions
Can the kinds of factors discussed here explain the observed divergence in un-
employment among European countries in the 1990s? Ideally, one would like
to show that in the low unemployment club, political constraints, ideologies, or
agency constraints were less important than in the high unemployment club.
It would be bold to claim that is an established fact; the general problem is
that there are only a handful of observations and that these countries differ in
a number of dimensions. However, the preceding discussion can at least suggest
a few hypotheses for future research that are likely to have some explanatory
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power.
1. Different shocks? One potential explanation is that the countries that
have reformed their labor markets faced different shocks, which led them to
different preferences regarding labor market rigidities. There is some evidence
that changes in employment protection legislation are affected by current busi-
ness cycles conditions. In addition, some well-known reforms, like the Spanish
liberalization of temporary labor contracts in 1984, seem to have been triggered
by a situation of very high unemployment which forced insiders to make con-
cessions. In principle, an economic environment which increases the exposure
of employed workers to unemployment, should be helpful for reforms.
A fiscal crisis could be another shock increasing the drive for labor market
reforms. Problems in financing unemployment benefits often force legislators to
reduce their generosity (however, they typically also increase payroll taxes at
the same time, so that measuring the effect on unemployment is unclear). Other
financial problems of the welfare state, such as funding public pensions or public
health insurance, also may have spillover effects on labor market reforms. A
fiscal crisis points to a need to increase employment, both because employment
offers a tax base for other programs, and because savings in unemployment
benefits may be used to ease fiscal problems elsewhere. In Germany, for example,
a fiscal crisis has prompted the government to propose a wide package of reforms,
including a number of labor market liberalizations (see EEAG (2004))
However, it seems unlikely that different economic shocks to employment
can explain all of the stark divergence across European countries with respect
to the evolution of unemployment and labor market institutions. Business cycles
are pretty similar and synchronized across European countries, and so are the
financial problems faced by their welfare states.
2. The Euro? A correlation seems to exist between whether or not a country
belongs to the euro area that and a country’s ability to reduce unemployment in
the late nineties. The three non-Euro countries in the European Community —
21
Denmark, Sweden, and the United Kingdom — are all in the low unemployment
club. In addition, Switzerland, which is not a member of the European Union
and therefore not in the Euro zone, has maintained a low unemployment rate
throughout.
Exchange rate flexibility may help an economy to cope with shocks. But
the benefits of such devaluations are not very long-lived. However, exchange
rate flexibility may play a useful role in boosting the political acceptability
of labor market reforms. A number of labor market reforms have short-run
costs, like wage losses for workers who have rents or employment losses for
protected workers, with benefits that only materialize in the longer run. Using
macroeconomic stimulus to accompany a reform can alleviate these short-run
costs (Bean, 1998; Saint-Paul and Bentolila, 2001). Belonging to the euro area
shuts down one instrument of macroeconomic stimulus, monetary policy, which
in turn may deter labor market reforms unless they are coordinated among Euro
countries.
While this argument about the benefits of exchange rate flexibility is cor-
rect in principle, it does not seem to reflect the actual experience of European
countries in the 1990s - that is, the non-euro countries do not seem to have had
a clearly more expansionary policy than the euro countries. A euro country like
Ireland did well at implementing reforms and reducing unemployment. While
some elements of labor market reforms are contractionary in the short run, like
reductions in unemployment benefits or deregulation of employment protection,
others reforms such as cuts in labor taxes are expansionary. A balanced package
of both types of reforms maintains macroeconomic equilibrium, which allows to
do away with monetary stimulus.
3. Path dependence? Another hypothesis is that countries in the high un-
employment club did fewer reforms because of greater status-quo bias. To go
beyond tautology, one would have to investigate the reason for such differences.
For example, perhaps higher employee rents are a source of status-quo bias.
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However, the evidence on employee rents reported earlier does not suggest that
countries with lower rents match those in the low unemployment club.
4. Small vs. big? It seems that smaller, more open economies have had
an easier time implementing labor market reforms than larger ones. Out of the
five European Union countries with 40 million inhabitants or more, four are in
the high unemployment club; of the remaining 10, only three are in the high
unemployment club. In political economy terms, there is clearly more scope
for raising one’s own wage at the expense of others in a large, closed economy,
than in a small, open one. In a small economy, specialized in producing only
a few products, the relative price of a good is pinned down by international
prices which also create a force for factor price equalization. Thus the scope
for redistribution between different categories of workers by manipulating prices,
which is what labor market rigidities achieve, is much more limited. In contrast,
one should expect more direct fiscal redistribution as a substitute. This pattern
reflects the experience of Scandinavian countries, for example.
5. Latin vs. ”Anglo-Saxon”? Countries that have been successful in reduc-
ing unemployment typically belong to Anglo-Saxon (or Nordic) cultures, while
Latin (or Southern European) countries still live with high and persistent un-
employment. If one considers the following list of six countries: Portugal, Spain,
Italy, France, Belgium, and Greece as defining the latter group, then five of them
are in the high unemployment club. Only two of the remaining nine countries
are in the high unemployment club.
One popular explanation, is that unemployment is more socially acceptable
in "Latin" countries (Bentolila and Ichino, 2003). For example, perhaps the
unemployed have an easier time in ”Latin” countries because the family still acts
as a safety net. This claim remains more of a stereotype than an established fact.
And even if it is true, why wouldn’t the generous welfare states of many Nordic
countries make unemployment equally acceptable there? Another possibility is
that southern European countries have more political resistance to labor market
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reform. In particular, Marxist parties have had more support in France, Italy,
Spain and Portugal than elsewhere in Europe. But we would still need to explain
why people develop and maintain such different views of the economy in different
countries.
One potentially productive research direction is to explain that discrepancy
in terms of multiple equilibria; that is, there may exist several self-sustaining
beliefs about the underlying functioning of the economy12. Even if one man-
ages to make such an argument, one must then explain how the equilibrium is
connected to "culture". Another research direction, popularized by La Porta,
Lopez de Silanes, and Shleifer, insists on the role of legal origins. In a recent
paper, joint with Djankov and Botero (2003) they show, using a cross-section of
countries, that countries with French legal origins tend to regulate labor market
more than common law countries. The puzzle then becomes: Why are legal
origins so important? They cannot be interpreted as a proxy for "culture", be-
cause their effects are identified by comparing groups of countries with similar
legal origins but very different cultures. One promising hypothesis is that legal
origins shape prior beliefs; for example, if markets are not left to operate freely,
there is less room for learning about how they work.
5 Conclusion
Since 1990, some European countries have managed to address their unem-
ployment problem, while others are stuck with it. The evidence suggests that
successful countries typically have implemented a number of labor market re-
forms. As this validates the "orthodox" view that rigidities are an important
cause of unemployment, one important implication is that it is unlikely that in
the future growth or a boom will persistently reduce unemployment in those
countries that have failed to reform so far. Political economy considerations, in
12See Piketty (1995) for an argument among those lines in another context.
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connections with beliefs and the economic environment, seem to play a role in
explaining the different geographical patterns of reform, but much remains to
be understood about the deeper causes of why some countries have reformed
and others have not.
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